I explore alternative central bank policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments. I use a mechanism design approach so that agents' incentives to default are explicit and contingent on the credit policy designed. In the …rst policy, the central bank invests in costly enforcement and charges an interest rate to recover costs. I show that the second best solution is not distortionary. In the second policy, the central bank requires collateral. If collateral does not bear an opportunity cost, then the solution is …rst best.
INTRODUCTION
A primary role of a central bank is to facilitate a safe and e¢ cient payments system. One source of ine¢ ciency in payment systems is a potential shortage of liquidity. Central banks often respond by providing liquidity through the extension of credit. Because of this role, a central bank must manage its exposure to the risk that an agent does not repay. Some central banks, such as the European Central Bank, manage this risk by requiring borrowers to post collateral. Others, such as the Federal Reserve in the U.S., charge an explicit interest rate on credit and limit the amount any particular agent can borrow. In this paper, I explore these alternative credit policies in a theoretical model of payments and o¤er a rationale for why some central banks may choose one credit policy over another. I do this in a mechanism design framework, paying particular attention to the moral hazard issues associated with the repayment of debt that alternative credit policies aim to mitigate.
The payment systems most relevant to this paper are large-value payment systems which are mainly intraday, interbank payment systems. Many large-value payment systems are operated by central banks and are often real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems. In an RTGS system, payments are made one at a time, with …nality, during the day. Examples of RTGS systems include Fedwire operated by the Federal Reserve in the U.S. and TARGET, operated by the European Central Bank in the EMU. 3 Because payments are made one at a time, liquidity is needed to complete each transaction. If participants do not have enough liquidity to make a payment at a particular point in time, they can typically borrow funds from the central bank by overdrawing on an account with the central bank, which they then pay back by the end of the day. The central bank faces a trade-o¤ between supplying this intraday liquidity at little or no cost to enhance the e¢ ciency of the system and accounting for moral hazard issues associated with the extension of credit. Of fundamental interest in this paper is how a central bank should design a credit policy for the provision of liquidity in an RTGS system to improve e¢ ciency while dealing with moral hazard associated with debt repayment.
The main contribution of this paper is a framework with which to study the alternative credit policies of central banks. The key features of the framework are (i) default decisions of agents are endogenous, and (ii) mechanism design. The …rst is important to rigorously introduce a moral hazard problem that arises when debt is extended. The second is a useful approach to evaluate what good outcomes are achievable under alternative credit policies taking into account agents' incentives to default.
This framework is applied to a model of payments that is similar to that of Freeman (1996) . Such a model captures some key features of large-value payment systems. These features are i) …at money is necessary as a means of payment, ii)
there is a need to acquire liquidity (in the form of …at money) during the day to make such payments, and iii) money is also necessary to repay debts by the end of the day. These three features provide an endogenous role for an institution such as a central bank to provide liquidity to facilitate payments.
An important abstraction in Freeman's original model, however, is that there is costless enforcement that exogenously guarantees that debts are repaid. Such an abstraction has led to conclusions by Freeman (1996) , Green (1997) , Zhou (2000) , Kahn and Roberds (2001) and Martin (2003) that a credit policy of free liquidity provision is optimal. These conclusions are immediate given that there is no explicit moral hazard problem in most of these models 4 . As a result, these models do not fully capture the trade-o¤ between providing liquidity to facilitate payments and minimizing the exposure of credit risk associated with that provision. Moreover, Mills (2004) endogenizes the repayment decision of agents under costless enforcement in Freeman's model and shows that money is not necessary to repay debts if enforcement is too strong and so the need for liquidity in the model is questioned.
As in Mills (2004) , I shall depart from this abstraction so that the default decision of agents is not trivial.
In the context of the background environment, I look at two alternative credit policies that resemble some of the features of such policies in actual large-value payment systems. The …rst such policy is that of costly enforcement and pricing.
The central bank invests in a costly enforcement technology that allows it to punish defaulters by con…scating some consumption goods. The second policy is that of requiring those who borrow from the central bank to post collateral. Under this policy, the central bank does not charge an explicit interest rate on debt. Collateral, however, may have an opportunity cost in that it cannot earn a return that it otherwise would have.
I use a mechanism design approach to see if the credit policies can achieve good allocations, which I de…ne to be Pareto-optimal allocations. It is possible for both types of credit policies to implement these good allocations. In the case of the pricing policy, I …nd an example of where the optimal intraday interest rate is positive because of a requirement for the central bank to recover its costs of enforcement. This di¤ers from the aforementioned literature and supports a 4 Martin (2003) is an exception. See below.
suggestion made by Rochet and Tirole (1996) Finally, in this paper the default decision of agents is endogenous, but the liquidity shortage is exogenous. This is complementary to an area in the literature by Bech and Garratt (2003) , Angelini (1998) and Kobayakawa (1997) . These papers endogenize the liquidity shortage by focusing on the incentives agents have to coordinate the timing of payments given alternative credit policies, but do not endogenize the need for such credit policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the environment while Section 3 provides a benchmark of optimal allocations. Sections 4 and 5 contain the main results as pertains to the credit policy with pricing and collateral, respectively.
Section 6 extends the analysis to include exogenous default and central bank losses. Section 7 concludes.
THE ENVIRONMENT
The model is a variation of both Freeman (1996) and Mills (2004 It is assumed that agents cannot commit to trades and that there is no public memory of trading histories. It is also assumed that agents do not consume any goods until the end of the period.
There is also an institution called a central bank that has three technologies unique to it. 6 The …rst technology is the ability to print …at money. The second is a record-keeping technology that enables the central bank to keep track of individual balances of both money and goods that a private agent may have with it. The third technology is an enforcement technology that can be acquired at a real resource cost > 0 per period. 7 The enforcement technology allows the central bank to punish defaulters by con…scating goods. The resource cost can be thought of as the cost of monitoring and the use of channels to con…scate goods to satisfy repayment. 6 What I call a central bank may also be interpreted as a private clearinghouse that is separate from the other agents. As noted in Green (1997) , it remains an open question as to whether the liquidity-providing institution in the model should be a public or private one and is beyond the scope of this paper. 7 In Freeman (1996), = 0. The sequence of events for each date is summarized in Figure 1 .
The setup captures some key elements of large-value RTGS payment systems.
In such systems, banks use funds in central bank accounts to make payments. In the model, …at money (in the form of currency) is necessary as a means of payment if trade is to take place because of the timing of trading opportunities within a period and the fact that there is no commitment and no public memory. 
BENCHMARK: OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS
Before describing the alternative credit policies, I …rst de…ne some optimal allocations. A …rst-best allocation is one that maximizes ex-ante expected steady-state utility of debtors and creditors subject to a limited set of feasibility constraints.
This limited set abstracts from incentive constraints which will be important for implementation.
Denote the steady state levels of consumption of both good 1 and good 2 by d z for a debtor and c z for a creditor for z 2 f1; 2g. The problem is then to maximize
with respect to I; d 1 ; d 2 ; c 1 ; c 2 and subject to the following feasibility constraints:
De…ne u z as the partial derivative of creditor utility with respect to good z and v z as the partial derivative of debtor utility with respect to good z for z 2 f1; 2g. Optimal allocations require that (2)- (4) are satis…ed at equality. The …rst order conditions, then, which satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for necessity and su¢ ciency simplify to:
Condition (5) states that optimal allocations are those that are Pareto optimal.
Thus, in what follows, I shall look for implementable allocations (ones that take into account the incentives of agents) that satisfy (5).
LIQUIDITY PROVISION WITH COSTLY ENFORCEMENT AND PRICING
In this section, I provide an example of a payment mechanism where a central bank provides liquidity with a credit policy of paying a real cost > 0 for the enforcement technology and charging an intraday interest rate (or price) for liquidity.
I characterize a set of implementable allocations via the mechanism as those that satisfy a set of incentive constraints. Allocations are implementable if they are subgame perfect equilibrium allocations. Finally, I show that the second-best optimal allocation that is implementable via the pricing mechanism is Pareto-optimal.
Recall that investment in the enforcement technology enables the central bank to con…scate goods from a defaulting debtor. The central bank can e¤ectively choose some combination of goods 1 and 2 to con…scate so that, in equilibrium, debtors will choose not to default. 9 This costly enforcement is meant to model the 
tially ensure that both debtors and creditors wish to participate in exchange. The next proposition characterizes the second-best optimal allocation via the payment mechanism with pricing and shows that it is Pareto-optimal. The optimal allocation is always second-best because the enforcement technology combined with the cost-recovery constraint reduces the amount of good 2 available to the agents.
Proposition 2. The optimal allocation implementable via the payment mechanism with pricing satis…es (5).
Proof. The optimization problem can be written as maximizing (1) with respect to I; d 1 ; d 2 ; c 1 ; c 2 ; r and subject to (2)- (3), (6)- (7), and
where (8) replaces (4) and (9) is the cost recovery constraint of the central bank.
Given that (2)- (3) and (8)- (9) hold at equality, and substituting these relationships into the optimization problem, the …rst order conditions, which satisfy the KuhnTucker conditions for necessity and su¢ ciency simplify to
where c and d are the multipliers for the creditor and debtor participation constraints, respectively. Inspection of (10) reveals that (5) is satis…ed regardless of whether the participation constraints (6) and (7) bind or not.
While the intraday interest rate may in ‡uence whether or not debtors participate in trade (for trade to take place at all under this credit policy, it is important that r = c2 is not too high that constraint 6 is violated), it does not create a wedge between the ratios of marginal rates of substitution and so is Pareto-optimal. This is because debtors do not have to pay the interest rate until stage 4 so that the cost in terms of good 2 can be shared among debtors and creditors.
One interpretation of r = c2 > 0 is that it is the optimal risk-free intraday interest rate. This is because (i) a positive interest rate is necessary for central bank liquidity provision (because of the cost recovery constraint) and (ii) investment in the enforcement technology eliminates the risk that a debtor defaults. This is a departure from the case where r = 0 (free intraday liquidity), which has been found to be optimal in papers such as Freeman (1996) , Green (1997), Zhou (2000) Kahn and Roberds (2001) and Martin (2003) . In each of those cases, it is implicitly assumed that = 0 so that there was no social cost attached to providing intraday liquidity. The positive optimal risk-free interest rate found here supports a recommendation suggested by Rochet-Tirole (1996) that costly monitoring of agents is necessary and liquidity providers should be compensated.
LIQUIDITY PROVISION WITH COLLATERAL
In this section, I provide an example of a payment mechanism where a central bank provides liquidity with a credit policy of requiring collateral. As in the previous section, I characterize a set of implementable allocations via the mechanism as those that satisfy a set of constraints. Finally, I show that the second-best optimal allocation implementable via the collateral policy is not Parteo optimal if collateral bears an opportunity cost. The …rst-best optimal allocation is achieved, however, if there is no opportunity cost to posting collateral.
The young debtors, when they seek liquidity from the central bank, pledge some of their endowment of good 2 as collateral which they will then buy back from the central bank at the end of the period (during the fourth stage). Recall that young debtors can invest their endowment of good 2 and receive a certain return of R 1.
Because the amount of good 2 they pledge is transferred to the central bank, there is an opportunity cost in that the collateral is no longer available to invest whenever
In terms of actual large-value payment systems, one can think of the opportunity cost of collateral in the following way. 10 Suppose that participants of the system can post only a limited set of assets as collateral. These assets are generally viewed as safe from the point of view of the liquidity-provider. Typically, such safe assets have lower (expected) returns. To the extent that participants seeking intraday liquidity hold more of these safe assets than they otherwise would without the need to post them as collateral, one could argue that there is an opportunity cost to pledging collateral. Notice that (3) and (4) are satis…ed at equality by the mechanism but that (2) is not when there is an opportunity cost of collateral (R > 1). Rather I = x .
The opportunity cost of collateral is then (R 1) which is the di¤erence between
Rx and R(x ) + : There is also an additional feasibility constraint that requires
. This constraint re ‡ects the fact that the amount of good 2 that generation-t 1 creditors can consume must be less than the total amount available at the third stage.
I now characterize the set of allocations that are implementable via the payment mechanism with collateral.
Proposition 3.
A steady-state allocation is implementable if it satis…es the following incentive constraints:
for debtors and
for creditors.
The proof of Proposition 3 is in the appendix. Compared with Proposition 1, Proposition 3 has an additional incentive constraint beyond participation. This constraint, (15), essentially requires that the amount of collateral that a debtor buys back from the central bank must be at least as much as the amount of good 2 a creditor is expected to receive ( c 2 ). Otherwise, a debtor, after acquiring some of good 1, would prefer not to exchange with old creditors to acquire money and so default on his debt to the central bank.
The following proposition states that the payment mechanism under a credit policy with collateral cannot achieve Pareto-optimal allocations when there is an opportunity cost of collateral.
Proposition 4. When R > 1, the optimal allocation implementable via the payment mechanism with collateral does not satisfy (5).
Proof. The optimization problem can be written as maximizing (1) with respect to I; d 1 ; d 2 ; c 1 ; c 2 ; and subject to (3)- (4), (14)- (16), and
where (17) replaces (2) from the benchmark problem and (18) is an additional feasibility constraint for stage 3. Given that (3), (4), and (17) will hold at equality, and substituting these relationships into the optimization problem, the …rst order conditions, which satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for necessity and su¢ ciency simplify to
where 1 is the multiplier for (18), 2 is the multiplier for (15), and c and d are the multipliers for the creditor and debtor participation constraints, (14) and (16), respectively. Condition (20) is the …rst-order condition with respect to .
For (19) to equal (5), it must be the case that 1 = 2 = 0 which is the case if (15) and (17) do not bind.
implying that v 2 = 0, which violates the assumptions about debtor preferences.
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Therefore, a solution to this optimization problem cannot have both 1 and 2 be equal to 0.
The intuition for Proposition 4 is as follows. Because there is an opportunity cost to pledging collateral, a solution to the optimization problem should minimize the amount of collateral required. For such an allocation to be incentive feasible for debtors, c 2 . Thus, an optimal allocation should have = c 2 so that (15) binds. But if (15) binds, then it turns out that debtors are credit constrained.
That is to say they cannot borrow "enough" from the central bank to acquire the desired amount of good 1 from young creditors. Thus, when collateral bears an opportunity cost, it serves as an endogenous credit constraint. This result is consistent with other papers on the use of collateral, such as Lacker (2001).
Given that the constraint (15) Proof. When R = 1, the …rst order conditions from Proposition 4 simplify to
As before, I need 1 = 2 = 0 which is the case if (15) and (17) do not bind. Such a condition does not violate (27) and is met when c 2 < < x c 2 or c 2 <
This gives su¢ cient conditions for which the debtor incentive constraint (15) does not bind. In this case, because there is no opportunity cost of collateral, the optimum does not require to be small. Thus it is possible to choose from a range of that does not lead to any credit constraints.
Notice that when there is no opportunity cost of collateral, the Pareto-optimal allocations are …rst-best. This is because the use of collateral in this case does not add any additional social cost. Only a subset of such allocations, however, are achievable because of the need to satisfy the incentive constraint of debtors.
EXOGENOUS DEFAULT
Up to this point in the analysis, the only type of default that is possible is strategic default. As a result, the central bank is assured of no equilibrium credit losses under either policy because both e¤ectively address the moral hazard issues associated with the repayment of debt. The banks that use central bank liquidity, however, are typically complex …nancial institutions 12 . Although credit policies may be designed so that a payment system does not provide an incentive for default, there may be other factors exogenous to the system that could lead a bank to fail to repay its debt, potentially leading to central bank losses. For example, a bank could become insolvent prior to repaying the central bank. In addition, the monitoring and enforcement technology that the central bank employs in the pricing policy may be less e¤ective than has been assumed here. It may not be able to completely identify institutions that are more likely to become insolvent, and in the event of a liquidation, the central bank may face uncertainty about its claims.
In this section, I extend the model to capture these concerns by introducing exogenous default. Speci…cally, assume that between stages 3 and 4 within a period, a debtor receives a shock with probability " that he loses all of the money and goods that he has in his possession. With probability 1 ", the debtor enters Under the collateral policy, the central bank is protected fully from losses because, as shown in Section 5, borrowing is fully collateralized. 13 Under the pricing policy, however, the central bank must recover its costs. The presence of exogenous default changes the cost recovery constraint of the central bank, (9) , to
which, given that the constraint will bind, translates to an intraday interest rate
Exogenous default, therefore, adds a risk premium to the risk-free intraday interest rate for a given level of creditor consumption of good 2. Alternatively, should the central bank wish to continue to charge the risk-free rate, implementable allocations would have a higher level of creditor consumption of good 2 and, by (5) would lead to a lower level of debtor consumption of good 1. In other words, exogenous default leads to "less" borrowing by debtors in terms of the amount of good 1 they can buy.
Moreover, exogenous default tightens the debtor incentive constraint, (6) . If the probability of default is high enough then the pricing policy could lead to a distortion that is more serious than that generated by the collateral policy when collateral has an opportunity cost; access to central bank liquidity would be shut down and there would be no trade. While this result may seem extreme, the point to take from the analysis is that less e¤ective monitoring and enforcement powers of the central bank may lead to a rationing of access to central bank liquidity under the pricing policy which may be distortionary and perhaps even more distortionary than what is generated by the collateral policy when collateral bears an opportunity cost. this is a high enough so that collateral may be the preferred option. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve already has supervisory authority over depository institutions it serves over Fedwire, so that economies of scope are likely to yield a low so that pricing may be the preferred option. In the case where the cost of both policies would be the same ( = (R 1) ), the pricing policy would clearly be preferred due to the result that collateral adds a binding endogenous borrowing constraint that does not permit a Pareto-optimal allocation.
Another credit policy tool that has not been modeled here is that of setting limits or caps to the amount a debtor can borrow. The Federal Reserve, for example, sets net debit caps that limit the amount that Fedwire participants can 
